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Abstract. There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously assert
a ‘must’-claim versus those in which one can use the corresponding non-modal claim. But it
is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is even harder to account
for this difference, since assertions of pMust ϕq and assertions of ϕ alone seem to have the
same basic goal: namely, coming to agreement that [[ϕ]] is true. In this paper I take on this
puzzle, known as Karttunen’s Problem. I begin by arguing that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous
only if there is a shared argument for its prejacent. I then argue that this generalization, which
I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization that ‘must’-claims are felicitous
only if the speaker’s evidence for them is in some sense indirect. Finally, I sketch a pragmatic
derivation of Support.
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1. Introduction
Compare (1) and (2):
(1) It must be raining out.
(2) It is raining out.
Intuitively, an assertion of (1) and an assertion of (2) have the same basic aim: they are both
proposals to accept that it is raining out. Once an assertion of (1) has been accepted, interlocu-
tors are disposed to accept the content of (2): that it is raining out. Thus (1) seems to be as
strong as (2). But it does not seem to be stronger than (2): it is very strange to assert (1) after
(2) is already accepted, as witnessed by the oddness of (3):
(3) ??It’s raining; and moreover, it must be raining.
This suggests that assertions of (1) and (2) carry the same basic information. Yet the conditions
under which they can be felicitously asserted differ in subtle ways. Suppose that Jane is in a
windowless room, and sees her colleagues come in with wet umbrellas. Then she can assert
either (1) or (2). But now suppose that Jane is looking out a window at the rain. She can still
assert (2), but an assertion of (1)—‘It must be raining out’—would be decidedly odd.
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Generally there exists a systematic difference between the conditions in which one can fe-
licitously assert a ‘must’-claim with complement ϕ , versus the conditions in which one can
felicitously assert ϕ alone.2 This puzzle, known as Karttunen’s Problem,3 gets to the heart of a
number of broad foundational questions concerning the meaning of epistemic modals and the
structure of conversation, and will be the topic of this paper.
The argument of the paper comes in three parts. In §2, I get clear on the data: what exactly
the difference in felicity conditions between sentences like (1) and (2) amounts to. The main
claim in the literature, which I call Indirectness, is that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous only if
the speaker’s evidence for its prejacent is indirect, whereas its bare prejacent can be asserted
whether the speaker’s evidence is direct or indirect. I argue that, while Indirectness is correct,
there is another, equally important, generalization which plays a key role in solving Karttunen’s
Problem: namely, that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous only if the speaker ensures there is a salient
argument in support of the claim’s prejacent. I call this constraint Support. In §3, I show that
once we have Support clearly in sight, we can derive Indirectness through general pragmatic
reasoning. In §4, I give a Gricean account of why Support arises in the first place. This solution
to Karttunen’s Problem predicts that assertions of pMust ϕq and ϕ have the same basic update
effect, while explaining why the former, but not the latter, requires that the speaker share an
argument for JϕK, and that her evidence for [[ϕ]] be indirect.
2. The data
The main extant claim regarding the difference between an assertion of pMust ϕq versus an
assertion of ϕ alone is that it amounts to an Indirectness constraint:4
Indirectness: A claim of pMust ϕq is felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence forJϕK is indirect; a claim of non-modal ϕ can be felicitous whether the speaker’s
evidence for [[ϕ]] is direct or indirect.
Indirectness is motivated by considering pairs of sentences like (4a) and (4b):
(4) a. It must be raining.
b. It’s raining.
First suppose that the speaker of (4a) is looking out at the rain. Then her assertion is distinctly
odd; whereas if she said (4b), it would be unmarked. By contrast, if she has a piece of indirect
evidence for rain—say, wet umbrellas—then either is felicitous. Indirectness is the most natural
generalization to draw from data like these.
Indirectness partly characterizes the difference in felicity between pMust ϕq and ϕ , but does
it exhaust that difference? Most of the literature on Karttunen’s Problem has indeed focused
exclusively on Indirectness. But a different, mostly neglected, thread has pointed to a further
2A ‘must’-claim is a claim containing an unembedded strong epistemic necessity modal.
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(2015), Lassiter (2016), Giannakidou and Mari (2016), Sherman (2016).
contrast in felicity conditions between pMust ϕq and ϕ: in making a ‘must’-claim, the speaker
must ensure that an argument for its prejacent is salient to all the interlocutors.5
Support: A claim of pMust ϕq is felicitous only if there is an argument for JϕK
salient to all the interlocutors; a claim of non-modal ϕ can be felicitous whether or
not there is a salient argument for JϕK.
The data that motivate Support are less clearcut than those that motivate Indirectness. This is
unsurprising: evaluating Support requires evaluating discourses as a whole, rather than single
utterances, and it can be difficult to determine, in a given context, whether an argument has been
made salient. In the remainder of this section, I will provide new data to argue that Support is
indeed required to account for the difference in felicity conditions between pMust ϕq and ϕ .
Consider the following case:
(5) Patch the rabbit sometimes gets into the box where her hay is stored. On his way out,
Mark hears a snuffling from the box. At work, Bernhard asks him how Patch is.
a. [Mark:] She’s great. She must have gotten into the hay box this morning.
b. [Bernhard:] Cute!
Suppose the conversation ends here, and assume that Bernhard doesn’t know anything about
Patch’s set-up at Mark’s house, or anything else which might help him figure out why Mark
thinks that Patch was in the box of hay. There is something distinctly odd about this exchange.
Intuitively, what Mark has said needs elaboration; either Mark should have proffered reasons
to think that Patch was in the hay box, or Bernhard should have asked him for reasons, perhaps
with, ‘Why do you say that?’ Here is a more felicitous version of (5); assume the same setup:
(6) a. [Mark:] She’s great. I heard a snuffling from the box of hay on my way out—she
must have gotten into the box.
b. [Bernhard:] Cute!
Now suppose the conversation ends here. This exchange has none of the peculiarity of (5).
Likewise, a non-modal variant of (5) is perfectly fine:
(7) a. [Mark:] She’s great. She got into the box of hay this morning.
b. [Bernhard:] Cute!
The infelicity of (5) thus seems to be due to the fact that a ‘must’-claim is made while no
argument for its prejacent is given.
Cases like this provide our first piece of evidence for Support. To get another case of this kind
on the table, consider (8), adapted from Murray (2014):
(8) On her way to a meeting in a windowless building, Sarah sees Jim enter with a wet
5See especially Stone 1994.
umbrella. Sarah enters the meeting. Thomas, who didn’t see the umbrella, asks ‘What’s
the weather like?’ Sarah responds:
a. It must be raining out.
b. It’s raining out.
c. It must be raining out; I just saw Jim come in with a soaking wet umbrella.
d. It’s raining out; I just saw Jim come in with a soaking wet umbrella.
Thomas replies: ‘Oh, too bad. Ok, let’s talk about the agenda for this meeting.’
If the conversation ends here, then (8a)—the variant with a ‘must’ and no argument—is odd,
while the other variants are fine—again, just as Support predicts.
Comparing ‘must’ with other words that might at first glance seem to work in a similar way can
help bring out the plausibility of Support. Consider (9), adapted from a television spy drama:
(9) a. The suspect is fleeing south. We’ve sent agents ahead to Mattapan.
b. Why Mattapan?
(i) Apparently the Russians have a safe-house there.
(ii) The Russians must have a safe-house there.
If the conversation ends here, then (9b-ii) is peculiar in a way that (9b-i) isn’t. ‘Apparently’, like
‘must’, is constrained by a form of Indirectness; but ‘apparently’, unlike ‘must’, is acceptable
here without an argument. Support predicts precisely this contrast (assuming that no corollary
governs ‘apparently’).
Finally, I note that the patterns reported here are robust across strong epistemic necessity
modals, in English and in all the other languages I have checked.6
I thus conclude that we should adopt Support as part of our characterization of the difference in
felicity conditions between a ‘must’-claim and its bare prejacent. Before moving on, let me say
more about what Support amounts to. First, what does an argument amount to? I will think of
an argument for JϕK in a particular context as a set of propositions which the speaker is com-
monly recognized to believe provides reason to believe JϕK—either by deductively entailing
its conclusion; by inductively supporting the conclusion; or by showing how the conclusion
follows from what is already accepted.
Second, what does ‘salience’ amount to? I won’t say much about this, but a few features are
worth noting. First, an argument need not itself be commonly accepted (i.e. common ground
(Stalnaker, 1970)). One can felicitously assert an argument conjoined with a ‘must’-claim, even
if the argument has not yet been (and never is) accepted by all the speakers (if Bernhard doesn’t
believe me that I heard a snuffling from the box of hay, this does not render (6) infelicitous).
The sense in which an argument Γ must be salient is rather that it must be common ground that
the speaker takes Γ to provide reason to believe the prejacent of her ‘must’-claim, and that she
is proposing to add Γ to the common ground. I will refer to an argument with this status as
6Bengali, French, German, Hindi, Japanese, Russian, Spanish, Swiss German, and Turkish.
‘salient’ or ‘shared’ or ‘publicly available’.
An important point about salience is that an argument can be salient without being made ex-
plicit. If Bernhard and Mark can both hear snuffling from the box of hay, then Mark can say
‘Patch must be in the hay box’, without any further argument. Here, the premise that merits
Mark’s conclusion—that Mark can hear snuffling from the box—is sufficiently salient, ren-
dering the ‘must’-claim acceptable. Similarly, arguments can sometimes be accommodated,
provided it is clear enough from the context what the speaker has in mind.
Another noteworthy feature of salience is that the argument in question need not be salient at
the time of the assertion; it can be provided shortly after the assertion, as in (10):7
(10) a. [Mark:] Patch must have gotten into the box of hay.
b. [Bernhard:] Why do you say that?
c. [Mark:] I heard her snuffling around when I was leaving.
3. Explaining Indirectness via Support
Support, in addition to Indirectness, is thus necessary to characterize the difference in felicity
conditions between a ‘must’-claim and its bare prejacent.8 How should we explain these dif-
ferences? There are three possible strategies: account for Indirectness and Support separately;
account for Support in terms of Indirectness, and give an independent account of Indirectness;
or account for Indirectness in terms of Support, and give an independent account of Support. I
will briefly arguing against the first two strategies and then pursue the third.
3.1. Against the first two strategies
Considerations of theoretical parsimony tell against the first strategy. What about the second?
This strategy is prima facie attractive, since there are a number of extant attempts to give an
independent account of Indirectness; it is natural to try to recruit them to explain Support. But
there are two significant problems with this approach. The first is that I do not believe that
extant accounts of Indirectness are satisfying. I will not make this case here, however, because
a second, simpler point suffices to show that the second strategy is wrong-headed: there does
not seem to be any way to reduce Support to Indirectness.
A natural first thought is that this reduction would go by way of a general pragmatic constraint
that requires a speaker to share her evidence for a claim if that evidence is indirect. But there is
no such pragmatic constraint, as we saw in cases above where non-modal claims were felicitous
without shared evidence. A closely related thought is that there is a general pragmatic constraint
which requires a speaker to share her evidence if she explicitly indicates the source of her
evidence.9 But, again, as the example above with ‘apparently’ shows—and as cross-linguistic
7As for other constructions that require something to be made salient, like anaphora resolution.
8I will not take a stand on the further question of whether they are jointly sufficient.
9Thanks to Justin Bledin for discussion.
work on evidentials suggests (see Murray (2014))—there is no such constraint: one can use
‘apparently’ or evidential marking without sharing what your evidence is.
A natural second thought is that Support reduces to a requirement to assure your interlocutors
that Indirectness is satisfied. But this approach is not plausible, for a few reasons. First, the
cases given above that are felt to be infelicitous without an argument—Patch in her box, Sarah
in her windowless office building, the Russian safe-house—there is simply no reason to worry
that the speaker’s evidence might not be indirect. Second, it is not generally true that whenever
a formulation is constrained by a form of Indirectness, the speaker must habitually share her
evidence in order to reassure her interlocutors that it satisfies the constraint in question: again,
we saw this in (9) with ‘apparently’, which is governed by an Indirectness constraint, but which
doesn’t require a shared argument.10 Finally, from a more theoretical standpoint, it is hard to
see why an Indirectness constraint would ever directly yield an obligation to share one’s evi-
dence: we are fairly charitable in assuming that speakers are complying with felicity conditions.
For instance, if Indirectness were encoded as a presupposition, then, on a standard approach to
presuppositions, it will be required that it be common ground that the speaker’s evidence for
the prejacent is indirect. But in general interlocutors are perfectly happy to accommodate pre-
suppositions,11 leaving it puzzling why Indirectness would lead to a requirement for a speaker
to share her evidence.
3.2. Deriving Support from Indirectness
I thus do not see a promising way for the second strategy to go. By contrast, I will argue now
that the third strategy—deriving Indirectness from Support, and then giving an independent
explanation of the latter—provides a satisfying solution to Karttunen’s Problem. In brief, the
idea is as follows. I argue that an assertion of pMust ϕq is a bid to update the common ground
with JϕK. Support then says that it is a proposal to do so on the basis of an argument Γ. General
principles forbidding redundant assertions entail that JϕK should not follow from Γ in a way
that is mutually recognized to be obvious. Finally, speakers are generally obligated to give their
best argument for JϕK if they’re giving an argument for JϕK at all. It follows that, in order for
an assertion of pMust ϕq to be felicitous, JϕK should not follow in a mutually obvious way
from the best argument a speaker of pMust ϕq can have for JϕK; in other words, a form of
Indirectness.
The first step in our derivation is the assumption that an assertion of pMust ϕq is pragmatically
strong in the sense that it is just as strong as an assertion of ϕ . Following Stalnaker (1978),
I assume that an assertion of ϕ is a proposal to update the common ground with JϕK. Then
we can spell out Pragmatic Strength as saying that an assertion of pMust ϕq is, inter alia, a
proposal to update the common ground with [[ϕ]]:
Pragmatic Strength: An assertion of pMust ϕq is as strong as an assertion of ϕ ,
10And, again, Murray (2014) likewise observes that grammatical evidential markers for indirectness do not give
rise to any obligation to share one’s evidence.
11See e.g. Lewis (1979), Stalnaker (2002) and many others.
in the sense that once the common ground is updated with JMust ϕK, it is updated
with JϕK.
Pragmatic Strength says that conversants do not typically leave open the possibility of J¬ϕK
after accepting pMust ϕq. To see its plausibility, note the weirdness of (11b) and (11c) as
responses to (11a):
(11) a. The gardener must be the murderer.
b. I concur. Moreover, the gardener is the murderer.
c. I concur. Let’s bring him and the butler in to see if we can pin down which of
them is the murderer.
Pragmatic Strength provides the most natural explanation of the infelicity of (11b) and (11c).
The second step is to note that in general, when a speaker tries to get her interlocutors to acceptJϕK on the basis of an argument, the argument must be non-redundant in a relevant sense.
Compare the two variants in each of (12) and (13):
(12) a. I put Patch in her box this morning, and no one has let her out. So she’s in her
box.
b. ??I see Patch in her box. So she’s in her box.
(13) a. Clinton has amassed a majority of pledged delegates and superdelegates. So a
woman will clinch the Democratic nomination!
b. ??Clinton will clinch the Democratic nomination. So a woman will clinch the
Democratic nomination!
Without further justification for their repetitiveness, there is something pedantic or redundant
about (12b) and (13b). By contrast, (12a) and (13a) are fine. The difference seems to be that in
(12a) and (13a), there is enough epistemic space left between the argument in the first sentence
and its conclusion in the second that its conclusion is not felt to be redundant. This intuition
can be regimented as a norm against redundant assertions, along the following lines:
Non-Redundancy: A proposal to update the common ground with JϕK on the basis
of an argument Γ is infelicitous if JϕK follows from Γ in a way that is mutually
recognized to be obvious.
Non-Redundancy nicely captures the contrast between (12a) and (12b). The first is acceptable,
since having put Patch in her box in the morning, together with no one else having let her out,
does not, in an intuitive sense, obviously entail that Patch is in the box. The second is not, since
it does follow in a mutually obvious way from seeing Patch in her box that she is in her box.
Likewise for (13).12
12Note that Non-Redundancy does not forbid post hoc support for an assertion with a redundant argument; it is
perfectly fine to justify oneself, if challenged, with ‘Because I saw it’. What Non-Redundancy forbids is making
an initial bid to update the common ground with something on the basis of an argument from which it follows in
The last step in our derivation says that a speaker must give the best argument for JϕK that she
has, if she’s giving an argument for JϕK at all. To see the plausibility of this constraint, consider
(14):
(14) John was at the Red Sox game and knows on this basis who won. He also read about
the game in the Boston Globe.
a. [Max:] Who won the game?
b. [John:] ?? The Red Sox, according to the Globe.
If John intends (14b) to answer Max’s question, then there is something strange about it; we ex-
pect John to give his strongest evidence for the claim that the Red Sox won. In general, speakers
are required to share the best piece of evidence they have for a claim, if they are sharing ev-
idence at all. This follows naturally from a broadly Gricean vantage point on conversational
dynamics. In (14b), John is violating Grice’s Maxim of Quantity by failing to ‘make his contri-
bution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)’ (Grice, 1989).
More precisely, the general lesson of cases like this is a corollary of the Maxim of Quantity
which I call Strongest Evidence:13
Strongest Evidence: When a speaker aims to update the common ground with JϕK
on the basis of an argument Γ, she is obligated to do so by providing the strongest
argument—the best piece of evidence—which she has for that claim.
We can now put these pieces together to derive Indirectness from Support. Support says that
an assertion of pMust ϕq is felicitous only if there is a shared argument for JϕK. Pragmatic
Strength says that an assertion of pMust ϕq is a proposal to update the common ground withJϕK. I will make the plausible further assumption that an assertion of pMust ϕq is thus a
proposal to update the common ground with JϕK on the basis of a shared argument for JϕK
(this is an assumption that will fall out of the derivation of Support below). According to Non-
Redundancy, JϕK must not follow from that argument in a mutually obvious way. According to
Strongest Evidence, that argument must constitute the best evidence the speaker has for JϕK. It
follows that in order for a speaker to be able to felicitously assert pMust ϕq, JϕK cannot follow
in a mutually obvious way from the speaker’s best piece of evidence for JϕK. In other words,
the speaker’s best evidence for JϕK must be indirect, in the sense of indirectness relevant to
evaluating whether an argument is felt to be redundant.
Put differently: Suppose a speaker has direct evidence (in the sense relevant to judgments about
redundancy) for JϕK. If she were to assert pMust ϕq, then due to Strongest Evidence and Sup-
port, she would have to give that evidence as an argument on the basis of which she is proposing
her interlocutors accept JϕK; but then she would be bound to violate Non-Redundancy. So if
she has direct evidence for JϕK, she cannot assert pMust ϕq.
In sum, in asserting pMust ϕq, the speaker has to ensure there is a shared argument which
a mutually obvious way.
13See Faller (2012) for more careful discussion of how this kind of reasoning would go. To spell out Strongest
Evidence in more detail, we need to be able to access a scale of evidential strength, according to which, say, direct
perceptual evidence counts as stronger than any kind of testimonial evidence.
represents her best evidence for JϕK, and yet is not so strong that it makes the ‘must’-claim
sound redundant. Thus JϕK can’t follow in a mutually obvious way from her best evidence
for JϕK. No parallel constraint follows for non-modal claims—since Support requires only
that ‘must’-claims be supported by an argument—and thus Support, plus Pragmatic Strength,
Non-Redundancy, and Strongest Evidence, entail a form of Indirectness.
3.3. Predictions
The present proposal derives Indirectness from general principles about redundant assertions,
and thus makes a striking empirical prediction: namely, that S’s evidence Γ for JϕK counts as
indirect in the sense relevant to Indirectness just in case an assertion of ϕ following sequential
assertions of the elements of Γ does not strike us as redundant. In addition to providing a
new explanation for Indirectness, this also provides a new characterization of the notion of
indirectness involved, an answer which I will now argue provides a better characterization of
the data than the natural alternative, according to which ‘must’ lexically encodes a requirement
that the speaker’s evidence be indirect in a sense that lines up with intuitions about whether
evidence is direct or indirect, and with categories which are encoded by grammatical evidentials
(I’ll call this ‘an evidential approach’).
I will highlight a few points. First, the present approach predicts that ‘must’-claims based on
reliable testimony like (15) will not be acceptable:
(15) ??The website says the movie is at 7:30. So the movie must at 7:30.
Our approach predicts this, since reliable testimony for [[ϕ]] is typically felt to be a redundant
argument for [[ϕ]], as shown by examples like (16):14
(16) a. What time is the movie?
b. ??The cinema website says that it’s at 7:30. So the movie’s at 7:30.
By contrast, this is surprising on an evidential approach, since testimony is, intuitively, indi-
rect evidence (it is natural to say that you know that the movie is at 7:30, but that you know
indirectly, via the website). An evidential approach thus must simply stipulate that testimony
‘counts as direct’ for the purposes of evaluating ‘must’.
The second prediction worth highlighting is that, on the present approach, what counts as re-
dundant in a given context—and thus judgments about the felicity of ‘must’—depends on what
counts as mutually obvious in that context. Thus, e.g., while (15) is infelicitous out of the
blue, it may be felicitous in a context in which the inference from website listings to fact is not
generally accepted, as in (17):
(17) Google says that the movie is at 7:30. Websites listing movie times are generally
14Why sequences like this are treated as redundant is, of course, an important question for theories of redundancy
to address, but one I will not answer here.
extremely unreliable. Google is extremely reliable, though, so the movie is indeed at
7:30.
Given the felicity of (17), we predict that a ‘must’-claim will be felicitous here as well; and
indeed, (18) is felicitous:
(18) Google says that the movie is at 7:30. Websites listing movie times are generally
extremely unreliable. Google is extremely reliable, though, so the movie must indeed
be at 7:30.
More generally, we rightly predict that judgments about the felicity of ‘must’-claims depend on
what counts as mutually obvious in context. It is not as clear how an evidential approach would
predict this, since it does not seem like what counts intuitively as direct versus indirect evidence
varies from context to context: our evidence for the time of the movie is equally indirect, in an
intuitive sense, in (18) as in (16).
Third, we can explain why ‘must’-claims that conclude a complicated argument are generally
acceptable, even if the premises of the argument entail its conclusion. Examples of this kind, in
particular those involving mathematical or logical claims, are the most puzzling examples for
an evidential approach to ‘must’. ‘Must’ is often warranted in mathematical or logical contexts,
like (19).15
(19) If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be decidable.
The halting problem is not decidable. So the set of validities must be undecidable.
It is not clear what the evidential approach would predict about (19). It is not clear that there
is an intuitive sense on which our evidence that the set of validities is undecidable is indirect.
Perhaps the evidential approach would claim that evidence for mathematical claims is always
indirect in the relevant sense. But in addition to being somewhat stipulative, this response runs
into trouble when it comes to examples like (20):
(20) ??24 plus 24 must be 48.
If all evidence from mathematics is indirect, then the evidential approach will wrongly pre-
dict that ‘must’ is warranted in (20) and sentences like it. In any case, it is not clear how the
evidential approach can distinguish between cases like (19) versus (20). By contrast, our ap-
proach can. The conclusion of (19) does not follow in a way that is mutually obvious from the
premises, whereas the conclusion of (20) does.
These points confirm the key claim of the present approach to Indirectness: what matters for
15Is the ‘must’ here epistemic? Some have argued that this ‘logical’ ‘must’ is not genuinely epistemic (e.g.
Giannakidou and Mari (2016), Goodhue (2016)). Two things militate against this option. First, it is inelegant to
multiply modal flavors further than we need to. Second, even if we say that the logical ‘must’ is not epistemic,
we still need a theory of its distribution, since it is not always warranted, even when its complement is a logical
consequence of the common ground (as examples like (20) show); simply saying that this ‘must’ is logical, not
epistemic, thus does not yet explain its behavior.
determining whether a ‘must’ is warranted is not whether the speaker’s evidence for it is indirect
in a sense which lines up with our intuitions about sources of evidence, or with categories
encoded by grammatical evidentials, but rather whether the speaker’s evidence for it makes the
prejacent mutually obvious.
I conclude by discussing a different prediction of the present account. I have proposed that
Indirectness arises due to conversational norms. It is a hallmark of pragmatic phenomena
like this that they can be cancelled, since the underlying conversational norms are generally
defeasible. We thus predict that Indirectness will be cancelled when one of the underlying
norms is not in play. This prediction, again, is borne out, in particular in contexts in which
Strongest Evidence is not in play because it is overridden by considerations which prevent the
speaker from sharing her strongest evidence for [[ϕ]]. For instance, suppose that Mary is at
Tom’s party. She goes out to the street to smoke, where she runs into Ben. She knows Ben
wasn’t invited to the party, and doesn’t want him to know that she was invited. Ben can hear
music coming from Tom’s place, and asks Mary what’s going on at Tom’s. Mary wants to
communicate that he’s having a party, but she doesn’t want to share her strongest evidence for
this—and doesn’t seem to be under any obligation to do so, since she is trying not to hurt Ben’s
feelings. In this context, she can felicitously assert (21):
(21) Given the music, it must be some kind of party.
(21) may be misleading, but it is perfectly felicitous, despite the fact that Mary’s evidence is
direct. The prediction of our pragmatic account is thus borne out: Indirectness can be violated
when one of the underlying pragmatic norms can itself be appropriately ignored.16
4. Support
Support plus independently motivated pragmatic principles thus provide a satisfying explana-
tion of Indirectness. I turn now to the question of how to account for Support. I briefly criticize
extant proposals before giving my own account.
4.1. Extant proposals
Support says that ‘must’ requires that an argument for its prejacent be made salient. A natural
first thought about how to account for Support is to treat ‘must’ as containing something like
an implicit indexical which refers to an argument: ‘must’ means roughly ‘it follows from this
argument that. . .’, where the implicit ‘this’ requires a salient referent. Stone (1994) suggests
an account along just these lines: on his approach, ‘must’ has a lexical argument place which
must be saturated by an argument made salient by context. In other words, ‘must’ denotes a two
place operator, taking an argument and a proposition p, which says that the argument provides
decisive reason to believe p.
16It is less clear to me whether similar cases can be constructed in which it is Non-Redundancy which is sus-
pended, since Non-Redundancy already has an element of context-sensitivity built in (since what counts as ‘mutu-
ally obvious’—in the objectionable sense relevant here—is itself context-dependent). But if we can find contexts
in which it is suspended, then we predict that in those contexts as well, Indirectness will be suspended.
But a solution along these lines, natural though it is, does not work. The issue stems from
the fact that no parallel to Support shows up for unembedded epistemic possibility modals.
Consider (22):
(22) Julie’s cat has been sneezing a lot lately. Ben asks her how the cat is doing. Julie says:
a. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet, he might have an upper respiratory
infection.
b. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet, he has an upper respiratory infection.
c. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet, he must have an upper respiratory
infection.
Suppose the conversation ends here. As Support predicts, (22c) is infelicitous as it stands,
without an argument. By contrast (22a)—like the non-modal variant in (22b)—is perfectly fine
here. This suggests that ‘might’ is not subject to a Support-like constraint.
If we took Stone’s approach, however, then, provided we assume that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are
duals, we would predict that ‘might’ has an anaphoric requirement for an argument, just as
‘must’ does: if ‘might’ means ‘not must not’, then the argument requirement of ‘must’ will
project through negation, and thus ‘might’ will require a salient argument, too.
We could avoid this by giving up the assumption that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are duals, and that
‘might’ does not have a lexical argument place for an argument. But, crucially, going this way
leads to a serious new puzzle. Assuming we treat ‘cannot’ as equivalent to ‘not might’, then we
will predict that unembedded ‘cannot’ does not have an anaphoric requirement for an argument
any more than unembedded ‘might’ does. But this is wrong: the same examples we used to
motivate Support for ‘must’ above can be used to motivate it for unembedded ‘cannot’ (modulo
obvious changes). Thus, for instance, consider (23):
(23) Emma notices that her neighbor Phil hasn’t taken in his mail in some time, and con-
cludes that he is out of town. Another neighbor asks if Phil is around. Emma responds:
a. No, he can’t be.
b. No, he’s not.
c. No, he can’t be: no one has taken his mail in for a week.
d. No, he’s not: no one has taken his mail in for a week.
The exchange ends here.
(23a) is marked as compared with the other variants in (23). As with the examples involving
‘must’, then, ‘can’t’ seems to require that an argument be made salient, in this case not for its
prejacent but for its negation.
Thus a lexical derivation of Support along the lines Stone suggests faces a dilemma: either
treat ‘must’ and ‘might/can’ as duals, and wrongly predict that the latter have a Support-like
requirement; or do not treat them as duals, and wrongly predict that ‘cannot’ lacks a Support-
like requirement. This approach thus strikes me as a non-starter.
Similar criticisms extend to the account suggested in Swanson (2015), who builds on Kratzer
(1981) in adopting a premise semantics for epistemic modals, with the added requirement that
those premises be publicly available. This approach faces the same dilemma. If we treat
‘might/can’ as the duals of ‘must’, then this explanation will overgenerate: it will wrongly pre-
dict that they are likewise subject to Support, since they will likewise require a set of premises
to be made public. Alternately, we could abandon duality, but then we cannot explain Sup-
port for ‘cannot’. The present objection can also be extended to a treatment of Support as a
presupposition.17 Presuppositions project through negation; thus a presuppositional approach
would either treat ‘might/can’ as duals of ‘must’, and thus wrongly predict that ‘might/can’
obey Support; or would abandon duality, and once again fail to predict Support for ‘cannot’.
4.2. Support as a manner implicature
We can avoid these problems by deriving Support as a pragmatic implicature along the fol-
lowing lines. The derivation depends in part on adopting a semantics for ‘must’ defended in
Stalnaker (2014) and Mandelkern (2016).18 I will not try to motivate the semantics here in
general terms, but here’s a sketch. The idea is that ‘must’ is a universal quantifier over the set
of worlds compatible with what is common ground after the ‘must’-claim in question has been
made and negotiated (either accepted or rejected; call this the prospective common ground).
pMust ϕq thus means, roughly, pWe will commonly believe JϕK after this claim is made and
assessedq; ‘might’ is treated as the dual of ‘must’, and thus pMight ϕq will mean pJϕK is
compatible with what we commonly believe, after this claim is made and assessedq.19 The
basic idea is the familiar one that ‘might’ and ‘must’ are used to coordinate on what structural
properties the context set has. I adopt the present semantics for ‘must’ partly because I think
it is plausible, and partly because it lends itself naturally to the present derivation. A similar
derivation of Support may well be possible with a different underlying semantics for ‘must’; the
crucial features of the semantics for present purposes are, first, that it is pragmatically strong;
and, second, that it makes salient the question of the interlocutors’ collective doxastic relation-
ship to its prejacent. Any semantics for ‘must’ with these two features will suffice for present
purposes.
On the present approach, pMust ϕq and ϕ alone have the same basic update effect: namely,
adding JϕK to the common ground. pMust ϕq is thus in competition with a different assertion
which has the same basic update effect but which is structurally simpler: namely, an assertion
17A suggestion due to Eric Swanson (p.c.).
18My approach and Stalnaker’s differ in some ways, but the differences do not matter for our purposes.
19This gloss is only rough, because these constructions embed differently. See Mandelkern (2016) for further
discussion. The basic idea for embeddings is that the domain of quantification for embedded ‘must’ is determined
by its local context. I will prescind from deciding whether to go in for a factive or a non-factive notion of common
ground in spelling out this semantics.
of ϕ alone.20 Because ϕ is structurally simpler,21 choosing an assertion like pMust ϕq instead
requires some explanation. Because the two options have the same update effect, the interlocu-
tors cannot reason that the speaker chose one of them because she didn’t know the other, or
knew the other was false (as in scalar reasoning). There is, however, an important difference
between pMust ϕq versus ϕ alone: namely, that the former makes salient the question of the
interlocutors’ collective doxastic relation to JϕK, while the latter does not: it is only about JϕK.
There are a variety of ways to make this intuition precise; it doesn’t matter for our purposes
how we choose between them.22 For our purposes, we can just treat the question raised by an
assertion of any sentence ψ as the two cell partition {ψ, ψ¯}. Then the question made salient by
an assertion of JϕK is just the question whether JϕK is true; whereas the question made salient
by an assertion of pMust ϕq is the question whether we will come to commonly accept JϕK.
Given that pMust ϕq has a simpler alternative with the same basic update effect (namely ϕ),
if a speaker chooses to use this more complex expressions, then we will seek an explanation
of this fact. Given that the chief difference between pMust ϕq and ϕ is in the question made
salient by each, we will therefore reason that, in choosing the more complex option, she wishes
to raise to salience the question of the group’s collective doxastic relation to JϕK, and thus the
group’s reasons for accepting [[ϕ]].
What kind of reason for accepting JϕK would be worth highlighting in this way? Whenever a
speaker proposes to update the common ground with JϕK, this provides ceteris paribus reason
for her interlocutors to accept JϕK: namely, the speaker’s authority. A reason of this kind,
therefore, is totally humdrum, and thus not worth highlighting. The use of an assertion like
pMust ϕq rather than an assertion of ϕ alone thus can be justified only if the speaker wishes
to highlight a substantial argument for JϕK—i.e., an argument over and above the speaker’s
authority—on the basis of which the speaker wishes her interlocutors to accept JϕK. In other
words (the interlocutors will reason), the speaker wishes them to accept JϕK on the basis of an
argument that is commonly available to them. The speaker must, therefore, ensure that such an
argument is salient—either by providing it, or being assured that her interlocutors can recover
it from the common ground, possibly by accommodation.
In short: Support arises as a manner implicature, thanks to the fact that the speaker chose
to propose to accept [[ϕ]] by way of an assertion which makes reference to the interlocutors’
doxastic relation to [[ϕ]].
This approach has a number of attractions. First, it derives Support from a simple, indepen-
dently motivated modal semantics, rather than lexical stipulation, and thus explains why Sup-
port arises for anything that has the meaning of ‘must’. Second, it avoids the problem raised
20See Degen et al. (2015) for a different manner-implicature based approach to explaining the behavior of
‘must’. Like the present approach, that approach relies on the assumption that pMust ϕq is a costly alternative to
ϕ whose use must be somehow explained. In contrast with the present approach, that approach attempts to derive
Indirectness directly, rather than by way of Support, and without adverting to the different QUDs raised by modal
vs. non-modal variants.
21I will not spell out assumptions about how we calculate which alternatives are relevant. It seems fairly
plausible that however we do so, ϕ will count as a relevant alternative to pMust ϕq (and p¬ϕq as a relevant
alternative to pCan’t ϕq); this follows e.g. on the account given in Katzir (2007), according to which alternatives
are calculated by the deletion or replacement of nodes at LF.
22See Lewis (1988), Roberts (2012) and citations therein.
above for extant approaches. If we treat ‘might/can’ as duals of ‘must’, we will predict that
the corollary of Support will be blocked for ‘might/can’, but will still be derived for ‘cannot’.
First, the derivation of a Support constraint for ‘might/can’ will be blocked because a crucial
step in our derivation of Support was that pMust ϕq has a structurally simpler alternative with
the same basic update effect; this obviously does not hold for pMight ϕq, which has a very
different update effect than ϕ . And, second, assuming that ‘can’ and ‘might’ mean the same
thing, and that ‘not’ scopes over ‘can’ in ‘cannot’, the derivation given above will extend im-
mediately to unembedded ‘cannot’, predicting in particular that Support and Indirectness arise
for the negation of the prejacent of ‘cannot’, just as they do for the prejacent of ‘must’.
Note that for the same reason that this derivation of Support is blocked for ‘might’, the corre-
sponding derivation of Support will likewise be blocked for weak epistemic necessity modals
like ‘ought’ and ‘should’, as well as probability modals, since assertions of pought/should/probably
ϕq and ϕ do not have the same basic update effect. These predictions again seem correct:
(24) a. When do you want to meet?
b. Let’s say Thursday;
(i) I should be free then.
(ii) I ought to be free then.
(iii) I’ll probably be free then.
(iv) I must be free then.
If the conversation ends here, responses (24b-i), (24b-ii), and (24b-iii) are all acceptable;
by contrast, (24b-iv) is a strange way to end the conversation, and seems to require that
some argument be given (‘. . .my secretary always leaves my Thursdays open’). The pre-
diction of the present account, then—that modals which are not Pragmatically Strong, like
‘might/ought/should/probably’, do not carry a Support constraint—thus seems correct.23
The present proposal makes a prediction which is worth highlighting: any construction which
has the features which played a role in the present derivation is predicted to give rise to a
Support-like constraint. That is, any construction which has ϕ as a structurally simpler relevant
alternative; which has the same basic update effect as an assertion of ϕ; and which highlights
the speakers’ collective doxastic relation to JϕK, is, ceteris paribus, predicted to give rise to
Support (and thus also Indirectness). Further research should examine other expressions that
share these three features to see if this prediction is borne out.24
23And the Indirectness inference for ‘might/ought/should/probably’ is easy to explain on pragmatic grounds
without a detour through Support.
24pIt’s agreed that ϕq, pLet’s agree that ϕq, pWe should believe ϕq, and pIt is clear that ϕq all seem to have
these properties, and do indeed appear to be governed by corollaries of Support and Indirectness (see Barker 2009
on the last of these). This suggests that, even if the pragmatic derivation I have given here is mistaken in some of
its details, the explanation for both Indirectness and Support is pragmatic, and stems from the properties I have
pointed to.
5. Conclusion
The argument of this paper has come in three parts. I began by arguing that, to fully character-
ize the differences in felicity conditions between an assertion of pMust ϕq and an assertion of
ϕ , we need not only Indirectness but also Support. Next, I argued that we can derive Indirect-
ness from Support together with general pragmatic principles about assertions, and I argued
that this derivation of Indirectness makes attractive predictions about when a ‘must’-claim is
unacceptable. Finally, I made a proposal about how to derive Support as a manner implicature
from a certain semantics for epistemic modals which treats them as quantifiers over the set of
worlds compatible with the common ground.
The three parts of this argument are, to a degree, independent. If each of these moves is suc-
cessful, however, then taken together, they constitute a solution to Karttunen’s Problem: char-
acterizing and explaining the differences in felicity conditions between an assertion of pMust
ϕq and an assertion of ϕ . In short: because of its more complex form and the question it makes
salient, pMust ϕq, unlike ϕ alone, requires that an argument be given for JϕK; and from the
requirement, in turn, we can conclude that the speaker’s evidence for JϕK is relevantly indirect.
In conclusion, I highlight a few broad upshots of my approach to Karttunen’s Problem. The
first is about the relation between ‘must’ and evidentiality. I have argued that ‘must’ does not
grammaticalize a certain constraint on the type of evidence, in any intuitive sense, which the
speaker must have for its prejacent. Rather, the felt indirectness of ‘must’-claims is accounted
for pragmatically, and it is accounted for not directly in terms of judgments about type of
evidence but rather in terms of judgments about redundancy.
The second is about the meaning of ‘must’. My derivation of Support rests on a certain seman-
tics for ‘must’. If the derivation is successful, then it provides an argument for adopting that
semantics, and presents a challenge for advocates of different semantics for ‘must’: to show
how those approaches can explain Support.
The third regards the theory of redundancy. I have argued that the norms that governs redun-
dancy in assertions play a crucial role in explaining our interpretation of modal language. My
sketch of what those norms are like, however, leaves unanswered substantial questions, in par-
ticular about what counts as a ‘mutually obvious’ inference—questions which I hope to explore
in future work. A theory of redundancy—in essence, a theory of how our minds structure and
access information—will play a central role in understanding the way that information is struc-
tured in discourse, and judgments about ‘must’-claims provide a rich source of data for this
theory.
I close with an abstract point about the architecture of semantic and pragmatic theories. My
proposal rests on the assumption that an assertion of pMust ϕq and an assertion of ϕ have
the same basic update effect, but different semantic values. Indeed, on the semantics I have
sketched, pMust ϕq and ϕ informationally entail one another—in the sense that a context up-
dated with either one entails the other—but they do not semantically entail one another. The
possibility of this divergence between update effect and meaning proved essential for simulta-
neously capturing the intuition that an update with pMust ϕq is pragmatically strong, and the
intuition that it cannot always be asserted where ϕ alone can be. Not everyone thinks that we
should distinguish between semantic content and pragmatic update effect at all; in particular,
at a high level, certain threads in dynamic semantics aims to identify these. If the present ap-
proach to Karttunen’s Problem is the right one, however, then distinguishing semantic content
from pragmatic update effect in our theorizing about natural language turns out to be crucial.
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